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LIMITATIONS ON CORPORATE SPEECH:
PROTECTION FOR SHAREHOLDERS OR
ABRIDGMENT OF EXPRESSION?

Alan J. Meese*

I. INTRODUCTION

Limitations on corporate speech are common yet problematic. States
cannot limit personal speech, and corporate speech is just the speech of
real persons associated in a business. So why may states curtail the
combination of speech and business? Several justifications are offered for
such limits.'
One such justification focuses on the corporate role in the political
process-a role many see as inordinate. Several scholars have argued that
the substantial wealth associated with the modem corporation provides
firms with the opportunity to influence unduly the political process by
presenting the public with too much of one point of view.2 According to
this line of thinking, limiting or regulating corporate political speech, as

J.D., University of Chicago; A.B., College of William and Mary. The author is an
associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in Washington, D.C. Earlier drafts
of this article were completed before the author joined Skadden, Arps, and the views
expressed herein are his own. John Duffy, Frank Easterbrook, Christopher Landau, Larry
Lessig, Richard Murphy, and Eugene Scalia provided helpful comments. Kathi Jones
assisted in preparation of the manuscript.
C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish 's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652-55 (1982) (corporate
speech deserves no protection because corporations have no "self' to fulfill); Randy M.
Mastro et al., Taking The Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process
Through Media Spending and What to Do about It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315, 350-57
(1980) (corporate speech should be curtailed in order to "equalize" political debate);
John S. Shockley, DirectDemocracy, Campaign Financeand the Courts: Can Corruption,
Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377
(1985) (same); Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1871 n.95 (1983) (same).
2 See, e.g., Mastro et al., supra note 1; Shockley, supra note 1, at 388-90; Content
Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, supra note 1, at 1871 n.95; Marlene
Arnold Nicholson, The Constitutionalityof the FederalRestrictions on Corporateand Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 945, 994-99 (1980). See
also Allen K. Easley, Buying Back the First Amendment: Regulation of Disproportionate
Corporate Spending in Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17 GA. L. REV. 675 (1983) (state should
counteract "undue influence" by, inter alia, subsidizing "under-represented" speech).
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well as other large-scale speech, merely protects the integrity of public
debate by restoring the balance between competing points of view.3
A second justification is concerned with the corruption, or appearance
thereof, that purportedly results from corporate speech during political
elections. Specifically, many contend that corporate expenditures in support
of political candidates create the possibility or at least the appearance of
a quid pro quo between corporations and the candidates they help elect.4
Under this approach, limiting corporate speech enhances public confidence
in the electoral process and thus promotes individual participation in the
democratic system.'
This Article explores a different justification, a justification based not
upon protection of the political process, but instead upon the regulation of
internal corporate governance. Limiting corporate speech, it is said, both
prevents wasteful speech and ensures that corporations do not compel
shareholders to subsidize otherwise profit-maximizing speech that they
may oppose.6 Such limits leave shareholders free to support speech by
contributing to so-called segregated funds.7 Because such contributions
would be voluntary, the resulting speech would reflect the actual support
for the views expressed. 8 In this way, some have argued, curtailing
corporate speech can protect the associational rights of shareholders and
prevent the theft of shareholder assets via wasteful speech. 9
Support for this rationale is not limited to the law reviews; politicians
have been offering such a justification for limiting corporate speech since
the turn of the century.' 0 As a result, several states and the federal
government have enacted laws restricting various forms of corporate
speech and sought to justify those laws by invoking what this Article calls

' See, e.g., Shockley, supra note 1, at 388-90; Nicholson, supra note 2, at 994-99.
4 See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 2, at 988-94. See also Shockley, supra note 1, at
383-88 (arguing that "corruption" rationale justifies restricting large scale speech even
when no possibility of "quid pro quo" is present).
See, e.g., Shockley, supra note 1, at 383-88.
6 See Victor Brudney, Business Corporationsand Stockholders 'Rights Under the First

Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (suggesting unanimous consent requirement for
corporate speech); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 173-74 (1978);
Shockley, supra note 1, at 421 (suggesting majority or unanimous consent requirements
for corporate speech); Nicholson, supra note 2, at 1005. There is no substantive difference
between an outright ban and an unanimous consent requirement. See infra notes 120-28
and accompanying text.
' See Brudney, supra note 6, at 257, 263-64; Shockley, supra note 1, at 421 nn.163-64;
Nicholson, supra note 2, at 999-1002.
8 E.g., Nicholson, supra note 2, at 1005.
9 E.g., Brudney, supra note 6, at 247.
'0 See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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the "shareholder protection rationale." The Supreme Court has avoided 1
and then obliquely confronted the first amendment question presented by
this rationale in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,12 Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 3 and Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.14 In First National Bank, the Court
rejected the shareholder protection rationale because the law at issue was
both under- and over-inclusive with respect to its stated goal, leaving open
the possibility that a properly constructed scheme would survive
constitutional scrutiny. 5 Next, in MCFL, the Court invalidated a
shareholder protection scheme as applied to a non-profit, non-stock
corporation.' 6 Finally, in Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a majority of
the Court avoided the issue, sustaining restrictions on corporate speech on8
other grounds.' 7 Justice Brennan, concurring, embraced this rationale,
which three dissenters rejected. 9
The Court's ultimate resolution of the first amendment issue presented
by shareholder protection schemes will have important ramifications for
corporate speech insofar as the shareholder protection rationale justifies
limitation of a wider variety of corporate speech than current law under
either the "undue influence" or "quid pro quo" rationale. The Court
has largely rejected the "undue influence" rationale for limiting speech
of any variety. 0 Further, while the "quid pro quo" rationale will support
the restriction of corporate speech connected with candidate elections, it
will not support restriction of corporate speech during public debate over
proposed referenda.2 ' By contrast, the shareholder protection rationale will
support the restriction of any corporate speech, whether or not such speech
"unduly influences" the political process or creates the appearance of a
quid pro quo between corporation and candidate. Moreover, the rationale
allows states to regulate corporate speech while ignoring other forms of
speech that pose the same perceived threats to the political process that
would justify regulation under the "undue influence" or "quid pro quo"
rationale. Thus, judicial approval of the shareholder protection rationale
" Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
12
13
14
'5
16

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
479 U.S. 238 (1986) [hereinafter MCFL].
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
FirstNat 7 Bank, 435 U.S. at 792-95.

MCFL, 479 U.S. at 256-65.

,7 Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 654-69.
ld. at 669-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
IB
'9 Id. at 685-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 707-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by
O'Connor & Scalia, JJ.).
20 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978).
21 See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 & n.6
(1981); First Nat 7 Bank, 435 U.S. at 790.
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would give state and federal governments a freer hand in regulating
corporate political speech.
This Article argues that the shareholder protection rationale does not
justify the blanket restriction of corporate speech, even though such
restriction leaves corporations free to "speak" via segregated funds.
Because corporate speech is a collective good, voluntary contributions to
segregated funds for its provision will far understate the actual support by
shareholders for the views expressed. The magnitude of speech financed
by such funds will not reflect actual preferences for such expression since
shareholders will have an incentive to "free ride" off the contributions
of others. Hence, a shareholder protection scheme does more than
eliminate wasteful speech; it also prevents corporations from overcoming
free rider problems and producing an optimal quantity of such speech.
Such a substantial burden on corporate speech is not narrowly tailored
to serve the admittedly compelling state interest in preventing wasteful
speech. The image of a helpless shareholder, whose property is embezzled
by management and used to subsidize wasteful speech, is only one
characterization of the relationship between shareholders and management.
This relationship may also be characterized as a contractual one in which
shareholders delegate to management the right to spend retained earnings
on speech. Banning such contractual or consensual speech certainly offends
the First Amendment. The choice between these two characterizations of
the corporate relationship depends on an assessment of the agency costs
that result from the separation of ownership and control that attends the
corporate form. Such an empirical judgment, however, is not necessary to
the evaluation of shareholder protection schemes. While mechanisms that
reduce agency costs are by no means perfect, they likely ensure that a
substantial amount of corporate speech is profit-maximizing and hence
consensual. Indeed, those scholars and judges that advocate limiting speech
to prevent corporations from unduly influencing the political process argue
that corporations engage in too much profit-maximizing speech.22 Thus,
limiting all corporate speech, without regard to its relation to corporate
success, is far too blunt an instrument for the delicate task of rooting out
wasteful speech.
Further, a blanket ban on corporate speech is not justified as an attempt
to protect shareholders from supporting profit-maximizing speech that they
find offensive. There is no support in economic theory for the suggestion
that corporations have coerced shareholders into supporting such speech
by means of "bundling" two distinct items, i.e., the purchase of stock
and an agreement to support corporate political speech via retained

22

See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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earnings.23 Given the free rider problem, providing such products
separately would entail significant costs; thus, the fact that such items are
offered in a package may simply suggest that their joint provision is more
economical than "unbundling." In any event, no firm possesses economic
power in capital markets sufficient to "coerce" prospective shareholders
into accepting an unwanted bundling arrangement. Thus, the presence of
bundling suggests a non-coercive, possibly wealth-enhancing rationale for
such an arrangement.
An exploration of these issues will follow a brief review of the history
of the shareholder protection rationale.
II.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt proposed limits on corporate
campaign contributions, with two ostensible24 goals in mind: (1) to prevent
directors from "us[ing] stockholders' money for such purposes"; and (2)
to "stop[] the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts."' 25 The remarks of
one member of Congress exemplify the first, "shareholder protection"
rationale: "no manager of a corporation has the right, to embezzle the
money belonging to the stockholders of the corporation and to divert it
from its legitimate use to a purpose for which the company was not
chartered. ' 26 In 1907, Congress adopted the President's proposal, passing
into law prohibitions on corporate campaign contributions,27 limitations that
survive to this day.28
Several amendments have expanded the scope of the 1907 Act, such
that federal law now prohibits contributions and independent expenditures, including expenditures for speech, by corporations, as well
as contributions and expenditures by labor unions, where such expenditures and contributions are in support of a candidate for federal

23
24

See infra notes 205-20 and accompanying text.
One commentator hypothesizes that Roosevelt's real goal was the protection of his

own party from big contributors on Wall Street. John R. Bolton, ConstitutionalLimitations
on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 376 n.14

(1980).
40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905) (emphasis added). The following discussion owes much
to Bolton, supra note 24.
26 Hearings on Contributions to Political Committees in Presidential and Other
Campaignsbefore the House Committee on the Election of the President,59th Cong., 1st
Sess. 76 (1906) (remarks of Congressman Williams).
2 Act of January 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864-65 (1907).
28 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988). At one time, criminal penalties attached to a violation of
25

the Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-283, title II, § 201(a),

90 Stat. 496 (1976).
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office. 29 Hence, as federal law now stands, neither a corporation nor a
labor union may, for instance, place advertisements in the media
supporting particular candidates for federal office.3 ° However, the law
allows stich entities to set up so-called segregated funds to solicit
contributions for such speech from interested parties. 3' Despite the apparent
interference with political speech, the Supreme Court has thus far avoided
passing on the constitutionality of the prohibition as applied to for-profit
corporations.32 However, as explained further below, the Court has
evaluated similar state legislation, albeit without considering directly the
shareholder protection rationale.33
Those who advocate curtailing speech to protect shareholders adopt an
approach similar to that taken by President Roosevelt. Claiming that all
corporations require shareholders to support political speech as a condition
of purchasing stock, these commentators conclude that shareholders are
coerced into subsidizing corporate speech.34 Because widely dispersed
shareholders have no control over management speech decisions, the
resulting speech will ordinarily reflect the tastes of managers and not
shareholders.35
Management's use of corporate assets to express its
political preferences, social views, or opinions need bear
little correlation with the political or social views of
stockholders. Both in theory and in practice, [i.e., because
stockholders exercise little control over management]
29 See Bolton, supra note 24, at 378-79. Of course, federal law leaves corporations free

to speak during state elections and ballot referenda, as well as in connection with issues
of national import not connected to federal elections.
" See United States v. International UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (sustaining, under
former 18 U.S.C. § 610, an indictment of union officials for "sponsor[ing] commercial
television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select certain candidates for
Congress . . .").
31 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1988).
32 However, the Court has construed the statute narrowly as applied to labor unions to
avoid constitutional difficulties. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
33 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
34 See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 6, at 264, 270.
3 Id. at 257 & n.81; Arthur S. Miller, On Politics, Democracy and the First
Amendment: A Commentary on FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 38 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 21, 38 (1981); Matthew J. Geyer, Note, Statutory Limitations on Corporate
Spending in Ballot Measure Campaigns:The Casefor Constitutionality,36 HASTINGS L.J.
433, 451-52 (1985). See also Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
1212, 1246 (1983) (shareholders usually have no idea what their company is saying);
Carol E. Schneider, Free Speech and CorporateFreedom: A Comment on FirstNational
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S.CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1262-65 (1986).
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management is substantially free to use corporate assets to
urge any political or social view it sees fit, so long as it can
establish a plausible connection between those expenditures
and a long term commercial benefit to the corporation
[given the lax business judgment rule].36
Further, even where such speech is in the economic interest of the
corporation, certain shareholders may disagree with the views expressed.37
Hence, commentators claim that such speech is really the compelled
subsidization of management views by shareholders.3a
Shareholders have no choice but to support a corporation's political
speech as a condition of purchasing stock.39 Prohibiting the use of general
corporate funds for speech, or imposing unanimous consent requirements,
while allowing firms to solicit voluntary contributions, will ensure that the
resulting amount of speech reflects the actual preferences of shareholders. 4
Further, such a regulatory regime will reduce the cost of capital by
ensuring that potential shareholders are not deterred from purchasing stock
by the prospect of supporting political speech they may oppose. 4
Several states have passed prohibitions similar to those in the 1907
Act.42 In addition, many states regulate corporate expenditures in
connection with ballot referenda.43 Although the Court has passed on such
statutes several times in recent years, the current constitutional validity of
the shareholder protection rationale is not clear. The Court skirted the issue
in Cort v. Ash. 44 There, a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel brought suit
under 18 U.S.C. § 610, the criminal provision implementing the 1907 Act,
alleging a violation of that statute by the firm's directors. 45 The Justices
refused to imply a private right of action under the section asserting that
"the legislative history of the 1907 Act . . . demonstrates that the

36 Brudney, supra note 6, at 257-58 (citations omitted).
17

Id. at 252-54.
e.g., Nicholson, supra note 2, at 999; Schneider, supra note 35, at 1266-67;

38 See,

Brudney, supra note 6, at 257 n.79.
3'Brudney, supra note 6, at 270.
40 See Nicholson, supra note 2, at 1005.
',

Brudney, supra note 6, at 235-36.

42 See, e.g., WISC. STAT. ANN. § 11.38(1)(a) (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 169.254(1) (West 1989).
43See Easley, supra note 2, at 680 n.33 (collecting statutes regulating corporate
spending in referenda campaigns).
4 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
41 Section 610 provided criminal penalties. Subsequent to the decision

in Cort,

Congress repealed § 610. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 496. Civil prohibitions remain, however. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1988).

312

WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:2

protection of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary concern.""
The Court observed, however, that protection of minority union members
was a concern when Congress expanded the Act to apply to unions, and
opined that this distinction might make sense, because shareholders suffer
far less "coercion" than workers who are forced, upon penalty of losing
their jobs, to pay union dues.4 7
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,48 the Court obliquely
addressed the constitutional implications of a shareholder protection
scheme. 49 There the Justices evaluated a Massachusetts statute ° limiting
expenditures on speech by business corporations in connection with state
referenda when the issue on the referendum did not "materially affect"
a corporation's business.5' At issue was the State's attempt to prevent
several corporations from expressing their views concerning a proposed
constitutional amendment that would have permitted the legislature to
impose a graduated income tax. Although it would seem that such
expenditures are material to a corporation's business,52 the state legislature
had specifically defined such expenditures as immaterial.53
The Court rejected the State's argument that the threat of undue
corporate influence justified the limitation.54 However, the Justices avoided
a full-scale evaluation of the shareholder protection rationale and instead
invalidated the statute because it was both over- and under-inclusive in
terms of this purported goal, indicating that the legislature's true goal was
the suppression of unpopular speech. Moreover, in a footnote, the Court
suggested in dictum that even a properly drawn shareholder protection
scheme would not pass constitutional muster, insofar as the asserted state
interest would not justify the resulting burden on speech.56 In this vein, the
Court questioned whether many shareholders actually desired protection,
since none had joined the State's appeal. Also, the Court observed that
Cort, 422 U.S. at 81.
47 Id. at 81 n.13. Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 710
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "[o]ne need not become a member of the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce or the Sierra Club in order to earn a living").
48 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
49 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1991).
50 Id.
51 First Nat 7 Bank, 435 U.S. at 765.
52 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 683 n.13 (1986).
13 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 151, § 8; see also First Nat? Bank, 435 U.S. at 769
n.3.
14 First Nat 7 Bank, 435 U.S. at 789-90.
" Id. at 793-95.
46

56

Id. at 795.

This absence of shareholder support seems especially telling. The appellants were large,
publicly-held corporations: First National Bank of Boston, New England Merchants National
Bank, Gillette Co., Digital Equipment Corp., and Wyman Gordon Co. See id. at 768 n.l.
5'
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each shareholder purchased stock "of his own volition."" Finally, the
Court suggested that corporate democracy could protect shareholder
interests.59
Justice White dissented, arguing that the statute was valid as a
shareholder protection measure. 60 As he saw things, the State had a
compelling interest in assuring that investors were "not forced to choose
between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and
passing up investment opportunities. "61 In so arguing, he repeatedly
emphasized that the statute only prohibited speech unconnected with the
corporation's business.62
Next, in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For
Life,63 the Court assessed the constitutionality of the 1907 Federal Act as
applied to a non-stock, non-profit corporation. 64 There the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") sought to prohibit the expenditure of general
corporate funds by a small advocacy organization, arguing that the Act
required such expenditures to be made from segregated funds.65 The Court
held that such a prohibition constituted an impermissible burden on
speech.66 In an opinion by Justice. Brennan, who had joined Justice White's
dissent in First National Bank, the Court rejected, inter alia, the FEC's
suggestion that such a requirement was necessary to protect members of
the organization from being compelled to subsidize the propagation of
ideas with which they disagreed.67 In dictum, however, the Court, without
citation of First National Bank, suggested that such a rationale might
support the restriction of speech by for-profit corporations.68
Finally, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,6 9 the Court
evaluated a statute prohibiting corporations from using general funds to
make independent campaign expenditures,7 ° including expenditures on

Ild. at
9 Id. at
60 Id. at
61 Id. at
62 Id. at

794 n.34.
794-95.
812-21 (White, J., dissenting).
818 (White, J., dissenting).
807-08, 812 (White, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, the Justice did not explain

why this limitation was logical in light of the statute's purported purpose. After all, some
shareholders could object to their corporation's speech whether or not it is profitmaximizing. See infra notes 205-220 and accompanying text.

479 U.S. 238 (1986).
64Id. at 238.
65 Id. at 252.
66 Id. at 252-56.
63

67

Id. at 260-62.

68

Id. at 261.
494 U.S. 652 (1990).

69

70 MICH.

COMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1977).
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speech, in connection with state candidate elections.71 At issue was
Michigan's attempt to prevent the State's Chamber of Commerce from
running an advertisement in support of a candidate for state office who
supported various forms of regulatory relief.72 Like the 1907 Federal Act,
the law allowed firms to set up segregated funds that could solicit
contributions from employees, shareholders, and the like. 73 Unlike the
statute at issue in First National Bank, however, the Michigan law made
no distinction between material and non-material expenditures. Instead, all
such speech in support of a candidate was prohibited.
The Court did not examine the shareholder protection rationale. Instead,
the Justices sustained the measure on grounds that reflected a "hybrid"
between the "undue influence" and "quid pro quo" rationales for
limiting corporate speech. First, the Court held that Michigan had a valid
interest in ensuring that corporations did not use their special economic
advantages to dominate the political process.74 Second, the Justices found
an equally valid interest in preventing the appearance of "corruption"
resulting from corporate expenditures in support of individual candidates,
an interest accentuated by the purported lack of correlation between the
magnitude of corporate speech and popular support for the views
expressed.75 Unfortunately, the Court did not indicate whether either of
these interests, standing alone, would have justified the Michigan statute.
In a concurrence, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority. He went
further, however, and found that the statute was also valid as a shareholder
protection measure.76 He agreed with the majority that "'[t]he resources
available to [a PAC [or segregated fund]], as opposed to the corporate
treasury, in fact reflect popular support for the political positions of the
committee.' ",77 Unlike Justice White's dissent in First National Bank,
which emphasized that the speech at issue there was not material to
corporate success, Justice Brennan emphasized the supposed coercive
nature of corporate expenditures on political matters-regardless of the
materiality of the expenditure in question. 78 Apparently characterizing all
corporate political speech as a form of theft, he stated:

U.S. at 652.
Id. at 713 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reproducing proposed advertisement). The

71 Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
72

advertisement, inter alia, called attention to Michigan's high workers' compensation
insurance premiums and high personal income tax rates. Id.
71 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.255 (1) (1977).
74 Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
75 Id.

76 Id.

at 673-75 (Brennan, J., concurring).
at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986)).
78 See id. at 672-75 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77 Id.
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[T]he State surely has a compelling interest in preventing
a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do
not wish to contribute to [its] political message. "A's right
to receive information [from B] does not require the state
to permit B to steal from C the funds that alone will enable
B to make the communication.""
Indeed, Justice Brennan analogized the "coercion" suffered by
shareholders to the sort of coercion endured by individuals forced by the
State to join and support financially a union as a condition of
employment.80 Thus, he continued, in the same way that state-compelled
support of union speech constitutes a burden on an individual's right not
to speak, so too does corporate coercion of shareholders constitute a
burden, the elimination of which constitutes a compelling state interest.8,
Given this characterization of corporate speech, Justice Brennan believed
it entirely appropriate for a state to outlaw corporate speech that is not
channeled through segregated funds. 2 Such action, he asserted, was
consistent with the historic role of state corporate law in protecting
shareholders and would reduce the cost of capital facing corporations. 3
Finally, responding to Justice Scalia's suggestion that shareholders agree
to such "coercion, ' 8 4 Justice Brennan stated that "[g]iven the extensive
state regulation of corporations, shareholder expectations are always a
function of state law. It is circular to say, as does Justice SCALIA, that if

Id. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Brudney, supra note 6, at 247). See
also id. at 678 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring) (referring twice to expenditures as "their
[stockholders'] money").
80 Id. at 670-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
8" Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 678 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 675-78 & n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring). Curiously, neither Justice Brennan nor
any other Justice realized or found it relevant that the law at issue was not a corporate law
that applied only to Michigan corporations, but rather a law that apparently prevented any
corporation, wherever chartered, from expending corporate funds on speech. Given this
broad coverage, the suggestion that the law was designed as a corporate governance
measure seems hollow. Indeed, any attempt to regulate the corporate governance
mechanisms of corporations chartered outside a state may raise substantial questions under
the so-called negative commerce clause. Cf. CTS v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89-90
(1987) (American "free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a
corporation-except in the rarest situations-is organized under, and governed by, the law
of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the state of its incorporation.").
4 Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Thus,
in joining such an association, the shareholder knows that management may take any
action that is ultimately in accord with what the majority (or a specified supermajority)
of the shareholders wishes .... That is the deal.").
79
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a State did not protect shareholders, they would have no expectation of
being protected .
"...85
According to Justice Brennan, then, failure to "protect" shareholders
allows corporations to "coerce" shareholders by conditioning the
ownership of stock on consent to the use of "shareholder assets" to
support speech a shareholder may oppose. Apparently the Justice agrees
with Professor Brudney, who suggests that, insofar as all corporations
"bundle" stock ownership with an agreement that retained earnings may
be used to support corporate speech, potential shareholders have no real
choice but to acquiesce in such an arrangement.8 6 Thus, according to
Justice Brennan, it is permissible for states to require corporations to
"unbundle" the ownership of stock and support for corporate political
speech, to protect shareholders from supporting ideas they may oppose.
The premise that allowing corporations to speak-or decide not to-coerces
shareholders in the same way that prohibiting all corporate speech does is
a controversial one, which will be explored below.
The constitutional status of shareholder protection schemes, then, is
unclear. At first glance, their status is moot; in Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, the Court sustained a ban on corporate speech that is not
channeled through segregated funds.87 But the rationale of Michigan
Chamber of Commerce-that states may prohibit corporate speech to protect
the electoral process from the appearance of corruption accentuated by
state-conferred economic power-only justifies limiting corporate speech
that supports a candidate during a political campaign. The rationale does
not justify limiting speech of the sort involved in FirstNational Bank, that
is, speech concerning ballot referenda, since such speech does not present
the appearance of any quid pro quo. As explained earlier, however, the
logic of the shareholder protection rationale applies with equal force to all
corporate political speech, including speech related to ballot referenda.
Several states have regulated corporate speech during referenda
campaigns.88 The Supreme Court invalidated direct prohibitions of such
speech in First National Bank,89 albeit witbout directly considering the
shareholder protection rationale. Further, well before Michigan Chamber

85

Id. at 678 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring). It should be noted that Professor Brudney

does not characterize all such speech as wasteful or theft. Instead, he recognizes that some
such speech is "intra-vires" at least within the context of a lax business judgment rule.
Still, he advocates unanimous shareholder consent for all intra-vires speech, regardless of
its relation to corporate success. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 252, et seq.
86 Brudney, supra note 6, at 270.
87 494 U.S. at 654-55.
88 See, e.g., Easley, supra note 2, at 680 n.33 (collecting statutes limiting corporate
speech in referenda campaigns).
89 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
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of Commerce, at least two states determined that limits on corporate speech
in connection with ballot referenda would not pass constitutional muster
and thus refused to enforce such limits enacted by their legislatures. 90
Neither state, however, considered the shareholder rationale as a
justification for limiting the speech in question. 9 Thus, the suggestion by
some commentators that certain "broad language" in Michigan Chamber
of Commerce would support the restriction of corporate speech concerning
referenda,92 as well as Justice Brennan's attempt to rehabilitate the
shareholder protection rationale, may well result in a renewed interest in
limiting such speech. Indeed, subsequent to Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, at least one state has enacted prohibitions on independent
corporate expenditures in connection with ballot referenda, 93-prohibitions
that have since been struck down by a federal district court despite the
court's speculation that "the logical extension of [Michigan Chamber of
Commerce] may eventually emasculate or overrule [First National
Bank]."' 94 It is therefore likely that the Court will ultimately be forced to
evaluate squarely the shareholder protection rationale.
III.

UNDERESTIMATING THE BURDEN ON SPEECH

Support for schemes that protect shareholders by limiting corporate
speech rests upon a balance of the burdens imposed by such restrictions
against the benefits of eliminating wasteful speech and protecting the
negative associational rights of shareholders. Formally, courts ask whether
limits on corporate speech burden first amendment rights, and if so,
90 67 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 211 (1978); Advisory Opinion On Constitutionality of 1975
PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich. 465 (1976).
9'67 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 211 (1978); Advisory Opinion On Constitutionality of 1975
PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich. 465 (1976).
92 See Michael J. Merrick, Case Note, The Saga Continues-CorporatePoliticalFree
Speech and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform: Austin v. Michigan

Chamber of Commerce, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 195, 236 (1990) (suggesting that broad
language of Michigan Chamber of Commerce could be read to support restriction of
corporate speech during ballot referenda campaigns); Samuel M. Taylor, Note, Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce: Addressing a 'New Corruption" in Campaign
Financing, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1060, 1077 (1991) (same). Of course, any such "broad
language" is dictum, insofar as the speech at issue in Michigan Chamber of Commerce
was in support of an individual candidate. Indeed, at least one Justice joined the Court's
opinion on the understanding that the opinion's rationale was limited to speech connected
with candidate elections. See Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 678 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (noting "vast difference" between referenda and political campaigns).
93See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-10.10) (Supp. 1993).
94Vote Choice, Inc. v. Di Steffano, 814 F. Supp. 186, 190-91 n.9 (D. R.I. 1992)
(preliminary injunction), and 814 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (D. R.I. 1992) (permanent
injunction). The court did not consider the shareholder protection rationale.

WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:2

whether such a burden is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
95
interest.
Two aspects of the burden created by shareholder protection schemes
are apparent. First, the requirement that firms speak through a segregated
fund imposes administrative costs of various types. Such funds must have
a separate director, keep separate books, actively solicit funds from
interested parties, and meet various administrative reporting requirements.96
Second, firms will not be able to use funds from the corporate treasury to
speak. It may seem that this second burden is irrelevant, given the
rationale for the prohibition. Prohibiting the use of general funds, while
permitting the solicitation of voluntary contributions, simply assures that
the resources devoted to speech will reflect the true wishes of shareholders
and others concerned. 97 Such an analysis, however, ignores a third sort of
burden: the limits that such statutes place on the ability of the corporation
to overcome free rider and collective action problems.98
A. Hampering Collective Action
Economists define something that provides benefits to two or more
people simultaneously as a "collective" or "public" good. 99 No one can
reap all the benefits of investment in such a good, because he or she is
unable to exclude others from its enjoyment.' ° Some goods, such as
national defense, are pure collective goods; it is impossible to exclude
one's fellow citizens from the benefits of their production. Other impure
collective goods are characterized by imperfect excludability. Individuals
or firms can appropriate some, but not all, benefits of investment in such

95 See Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 657.
96 See id. at 657-58 ("These hurdles 'impose[d] administrative costs that many small
entities [might] be unable to bear ....
' ") (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254 (1987) (plurality opinion)) (alterations

in original).
97 See id. at 659-60; Nicholson, supra note 2, at 1005.

See David A. Grossberg, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on
Corporateand Union Campaign Contributionsand Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148,
155 (1974) (discussing free rider effect); Roberta Romano, Metapolities and Corporate
Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 998 (1984) (same); cf. Christina E. Wells, Comment,
Mandatory Student Fees: First Amendment Concerns and University Discretion, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 363, 370 n.38 (1988) (reliance upon voluntary contributions to campus public
interest groups will create free rider problems).
99 J. RONNIE DAVIS & CHARLES W. MEYER, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 25 (1983).
'0o RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6 (1986); DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 99, at 50-51; George
J. Stigler, Free riders and collective action: an appendix to theories of economic
regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 359 (1974).
98
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goods to themselves.' 0 ' Research and development exemplifies the impure
collective good; a firm that creates a new product or production process
reaps some, but usually not all, of the benefits of that creation. Private or
voluntary production of such goods will fall far below the socially optimal
10 2
level; just how far depends largely on the extent of non-excludability.
The production of collective goods, whether pure or imperfect, is
characterized by "free riding." Assume that one is a member of a group
that would benefit from the collective production of a particular good.
Whether or not the group is able to exclude "outsiders" from enjoyment
of the fruits of its investments, a member may conclude that, if everyone
else contributes to that investment, his or her own contribution will have
a negligible effect on the ultimate provision of the good.' 03 Or, he or she
may conclude that, if no one else contributes, only a negligible amount of
the good will be produced. 10 4 Such calculus may lead an individual to
conclude that he or she is better off, no matter what others do, if he or she
makes no contribution.'0 5 Such strategic behavior, known as free riding,
will cause voluntary contributions for collective goods to understate the
actual support for their production. 10 6 Indeed, as a matter of theory, no
rational member of a diffuse group would contribute to the provision of a
collective good.' 07
Political speech is a collective good. Citizens and interest groups are
not able to exclude others from the benefits of such speech, and they have
an incentive to free ride off of the efforts of their fellows. 10 8 This is no less
true when such speech is on behalf of corporations. If one firm speaks,
other firms, as well as shareholders, are likely to benefit. Here again, one
would expect that free riding by corporations would hamper the production
of corporate speech.
It has not.'09 To begin with, the free rider problem is not equally acute
in all circumstances. Sometimes incentives may be such that firms can at
'0'

at 7.
supra note 99, at 51.

CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 100,

102 Id.

at 6-7; DAVIS & MEYER,

103 DAVIS & MEYER,

supra note 99, at 51; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE

ACTION 16, 28 (1965).
'04 DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 99, at 51; OLSON, supra note 103, at 16, 28.
10s DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 99, at 51; OLSON, supra note 103, at 16, 28.
106 OLSON, supra note 103, at 27 ("Normally, the provision of the collective good will
be strikingly suboptimal .... "); DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 99, at 50-51.
107 OLSON, supra note 103, at 28 ("[T]here is a tendency for large groups to fail to
provide themselves with any collective good at all .... ").
108 Daniel

H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent

Experience, Public Choice Theory and the FirstAmendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 505,
571-75 (1982); William Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate Persons and Freedom of
Speech: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 494, 508.
'o See generally Stigler, supra note 100.
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least partially overcome the problem, either individually or collectively."'
Moreover, firms often mitigate free rider problems through the agency of
trade associations.' Associations, such as the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, provide non-collective goods to their members in return for
annual membership dues." 2 By charging dues that exceed the cost of
providing non-collective goods, associations are able to raise funds for the
provision of collective goods. 1 3 Such dues, of course, are not solicited
from individual shareholders; they instead are paid directly from the
corporate treasury. By using retained earnings to pay such dues and thus
support speech, firms are able to overcome the free rider problems inherent
in a system of voluntary contributions.
Requiring .firms and trade associations to speak only through
segregated funds nullifies arrangements that mitigate free rider problems.
If one shareholder contributes to a segregated fund, all shareholders stand
to reap the benefits. Even if the speaking shareholder could collect all the
benefits of his or her actions, he or she might still choose not to speak,
hoping that others will do so. Thus, requiring firms to solicit funds
voluntarily leaves shareholders in a position to free ride off of the efforts
of their fellow shareholders, ensuring that voluntary contributions for
speech understate actual shareholder support, while at the same time
leaving those shareholders who refuse to contribute unfairly enriched as
4
they reap the benefits produced by the contributions of others."
B. Size of the Burden
It is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the extent to which
voluntary contributions to segregated funds will understate the true support
of shareholders for speech. Professor Brudney claims that "[i]n theory, the
free rider cost to the majority is trivial compared to the cost of forcing the

"0 For instance, where the speech at issue relates solely to a particular industry
dominated by a few firms, an individual firm might appropriate a significant portion of
its investment in speech. In addition, such conditions may facilitate agreements between
firms to engage in speech collectively. Cf.Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (Sherman Act does not forbid agreements to
petition the government).
... OLSON, supra note 103, at 145.
12 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990)
(describing various services provided by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce to its
members).
13 See OLSON, supra note 103; at 145 (suggesting that such arrangements
are
essentially "bundling" or "tying" arrangements). See also Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. at 663 (noting "economic disincentive" to disassociate from the
Chamber of Commerce given the services provided).
"' See Romano, supra note 98; Grossberg, supra note 98, at 155.
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minority to speak against its will. On a practical level pressures of group
membership may dilute free rider costs."' "1 5 Brudney does not identify the
"theory" supporting his calculus. One wonders whether he would agree
with the paraphrase: the free rider cost to the majority of a voluntary
system of contribution to the provision of national defense, which some
find abhorrent for religious reasons, is trivial compared to the cost of
forcing individuals to support such payments against their will.
In fact, several factors combine to suggest that the free rider problem
is especially acute among shareholders. First, the "pressures of group
membership" that attenuate free riding in some contexts is utterly absent
where shareholders are concerned. Unlike union members, for instance,
shareholders do not know one another; they are thus incapable of
subjecting each other to the sort of social "coercion" that can mitigate
free riding." 6 Indeed, the very dispersion that proponents of shareholder
protection regimes emphasize as a source of shareholder weakness is the
same dispersion that makes it virtually impossible for shareholders to
monitor each other. 1 7 Second, free rider problems are most severe when,
as in the case of corporations and their shareholders, "the number of
beneficiaries is large, and the effect of any one person's contribution is
small." 1 8 Third, shareholders are unlikely to have any emotional,
altruistic, or moral attachment to their firm. While such attachments may
attenuate the problem in labor and eleemosynary organizations," 9 it is not
likely to have much effect in the corporate context.
C. Mitigating the Burden by Means of Consent Requirements
Of course, protecting shareholders by means of a total ban goes a bit
far. After all, some corporate speech might be acceptable to all shareholders, and no one needs protection from speech to which he or she consents.
Thus, some scholars have advocated "unanimous consent" requirements
instead of blanket prohibitions. 120 Instead of preventing speech outright,

Brudney, supra note 6, at 259.
supra note 103, at 60-62; see also Brudney, supra note 6, at 259 n.85

116 OLSON,

(arguing that peer pressure will dilute free rider costs, especially in the union context);
Grossberg, supra note 98, at 155 n.47 (peer pressure and "covert coercion" may
mitigate free rider effect in the union context).
117See OLSON, supra note 103, at 62 ("[Slocial pressure and social incentives operate
only in groups of smaller size, in the groups so small that the members can have face-toface contact with one another.").
118 DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 99, at 33. See also OLSON, supra note 103, at 35.
19

Grossberg, supra note 98, at 155 n.47 (non-economic attachment to a union may

dilute the free rider effect).
120 See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 6, at 235; Shockley, supra note 1, at 421.
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states could require a firm to obtain the unanimous consent of its
shareholders before speaking out on any given topic. Formally, such
arrangements are less onerous than direct bans. After all, they leave firms
free to speak. In reality, however, unanimous consent requirements will
have the same effect as a total prohibition.
Such requirements will protect each and every shareholder from
offensive speech decisions in the same way that requiring a unanimous
referendum vote for each government decision would prevent each citizen
from supporting any action that offends him or her. 2 ' The cost of such
protection is high. It is a basic rule of collective choice theory that, as the
proportion of a body necessary to reach a decision increases, so too does
the cost of reaching that decision. 122 First, the actual costs of deliberation
and bargaining increase. Such costs include out-of-pocket expenses, the
opportunity costs of such bargaining, and the costs of the delay that
ensues. Second, as larger and larger majorities are required to reach a
decision, minorities-some of whom may actually support the proposed
action-will be able to appropriate a greater share of the benefits of the
proposed action by holding out and seeking compensation for their votes,
thereby further increasing the costs of bargaining. 23 Such factors have the
potential to paralyze corporate attempts at speech. 24 This problem is likely
to be most acute in the corporate arena, where shareholders can purchase
shares solely for the purpose of engaging in such strategic behavior.
In deciding what proportion of members is necessary to make a
collective decision, organizations should choose the proportion that
minimizes the expected costs of imposing unwanted policies upon
members and the expected costs of reaching decisions. 25 In the political
context, unanimous consent requirements are unheard of; indeed, even
supermajority requirements are often criticized as unduly onerous. 26 This
same logic should apply even more strongly in the corporate context where
both the threat of shareholder exit and other market mechanisms provide
additional protection against excesses of majority rule. 127 In the same way
121

See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 62-68

(1965).

Id. at 68; DAVIS &

MEYER, supra note 99, at 52-54.
supra note 103, at 41; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 121, at 68-69.
124 Cf. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 722 (1983)
122

123 OLSON,

(supermajority voting requirements increase the probability of deadlock and other
paralysis).
125 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 121, at 69-72.
126

See, e.g.,

Note,

The Balanced Budget Amendment: An

Inquiry Into

Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1600, 1609-10 & n.53 (1983) (60% supermajority
requirement for deficit spending would improperly restrict Congress' ability to conduct
fiscal policy).
27 See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
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that onerous administrative requirements are treated as burdens on speech,
so too should unanimity requirements be treated as direct abridgments.' 28
At any rate, a discussion of unanimous consent requirements is
academic. No state has adopted this method of mitigating the free rider
problem.
D. Ignoring the Burden on Speech
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 29 the Court explicitly
recognized the free rider problem in the union shop context.130 There and
elsewhere, the Court has held that the amelioration of free riding is a
compelling state interest of the sort that will justify requiring non-union
workers to support financially an association-a union-they do not
otherwise wish to join. 3 ' A close reading of the corporate speech cases,
however, suggests that the Court has ignored the free rider problem and
thus undervalued the burden on speech imposed by bans on corporate
speech. For instance, in MCFL'32 the Court focused almost exclusively on
the various administrative costs that would attend the formation of the
separate political funds not affected by the law at issue. 133 The Court fully
discussed such burdens, noting that they included the cost of maintaining
a separate treasurer, keeping detailed records of contributions, filing
statements of organization with state authorities, and the like. 34 Justice
Brennan described the effects of such requirements in painstaking detail,
noting, for instance, that the provisions would impose the cost of ensuring
that purchasers at garage sales were in fact among the class of individuals
not prohibited by law from contributing to the segregated fund. 135 Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 136 largely appropriated this discussion
from MCFL, and only mentioned in passing the limitation upon
expenditures from the general corporate treasury, without providing any
128

See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990)

(describing burden imposed by onerous procedural requirements). Professor Brudney
would ameliorate the unanimous consent requirement by allowing objecting shareholders
simply to obtain a refund instead of conferring any veto power upon them. Brudney,
supra note 6, at 263 n.99. However, as one scholar has noted, such a system would not
appreciably ameliorate the free rider problem. See Romano, supra note 98, at 994 n.217.
129 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
130 Id.

'1

at 221-22.

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1957-58 (1991); Abood, 431 U.S.

at 209.
132

479 U.S. 238 (1986).

id.
'34id.

133

135
136

at 254-55.
Id. at 255.
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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analysis of the potential effect of this limit.' Indeed, the Court assumed
that a voluntary contribution system would assure that contributions
reflected actual support for the ideas expressed.' 38
Concurring in Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Justice Brennan agreed
that the resources contributed to a segregated fund would reflect actual
support for the ideas expressed. 39 He went further than the majority,
however, and claimed that "[t]he segregated fund requirement ... has not
burdened significantly the Chamber's speech [because the Chamber has
been able to solicit large contributions for speech] ."" Like those of the
majority, these statements indicate a lack of appreciation of the free rider
effect. By definition, voluntary support of collective goods reflects actual
support for the ideas expressed. However, such contributions do not reflect
the true, total support for such views. Instead, as explained earlier, voluntary
contributions for the provision of collective goods will understate the true
preferences of contributors. Further, contrary to Justice Brennan's suggestion, the gross volume of contributions solicited reveals nothing about the
burden on speech wrought by a prohibition on corporate speech. It merely
begs the question "compared to what?" A charity that solicits large contributions in the face of collective action problems could solicit even larger
contributions absent such problems. Similarly, a segregated fund may amass
significant resources; absent free riding, the same fund would receive a
larger, optimal amount of contributions. The size of the burden on speech
would equal the difference between the optimal and sub-optimal collections.
As shown earlier, this difference represents a substantial quantity of speech.
IV. How COMPELLING?
Forcing firms to fund speech via individual contributions will burden
corporate expression significantly. In order to justify such a large burden on
high value speech, therefore, shareholder protection schemes must be
"narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' 4' The discussion
below shows that such schemes do not pass this test. To be precise,
shareholder protection regimes are premised upon a particular, controversial
view of the corporation. Adoption of a competing, contractual view
eliminates entirely the perceived basis for such limitations. One, however,
need not adopt one view or the other to find that such schemes are
unconstitutional, since they likely limit a substantial amount of profitmaximizing, i.e., consensual, speech and thus are not narrowly tailored to
...Id. at 657-58.
138 Id. at 660-61.
139 Id. at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring).
140

Id. at 676 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
at 657; Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).

141 Id.
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their purported end. Further, such a burden is not justified as an attempt to
protect shareholders from supporting profit-maximizing speech that they find
offensive. The prevalence of "bundling" of the purchase of stock with an
agreement to support corporate political speech suggests that such bundling
creates significant cost savings. At any rate, no firm possesses economic
power in capital markets sufficient to exact undesired compliance with a
bundling arrangement.
A. Berle and Means
Limiting speech in order to protect shareholders may suffer from a basic
flaw, namely, an incorrect assumption about the nature of the corporation.
As one scholar has noted, advocates of shareholder protection schemes
implicitly adopt the Berle and Means model of the corporation, assuming
that directors pay little or no heed to the views of investors with the result
that corporate speech mimics the tastes of management. 142 The discussion
below scrutinizes the influence of the Berle and Means hypothesis 14 3 on the
shareholder protection rationale and discusses a competing, contractual
model of corporate relations. While the Berle and Means hypothesis may
support the large-scale restriction of high value speech, the competing,
contractual view does not. As a result, it appears that a constitutional
evaluation of shareholder protection measures would require the Court to
determine which model of the corporation is more consonant with economic
reality. In the abstract, such a choice of form should be guided by substance,
i.e., by a determination of the magnitude of agency costs that attend the
separation of ownership from control. The section concludes that the
evaluation of such schemes does not require such a choice between
characterizations. Instead, because several mechanisms align the interests of
managers and shareholders, a significant amount of corporate speech is
profit-maximizing. Hence, regardless of the ultimate characterization of the
corporation, blanket prohibitions on corporate speech are not narrowly
tailored to meet the purported interest in protecting shareholders.
1. Form
The Berle and Means hypothesis is a familiar one. The corporation is
characterized by the separation of ownership and control. 144 Shareholders
"hold title" to the corporation's assets, while managers and directors have
142

Romano, supra note 98, at 994-96 & n.223; see also Schneider, supra note 35, at

1263 (adopting Berle and Means framework).
143

ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GORDON MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY (1932).
144 BERLE & MEANS,

supra note 143, at 1-9, 122-25.
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dominion and control.'4 5 Shareholders could rise up any day and vote
directors out, but never do, because managers control the proxy system. This
image, powerless shareholders and all-powerful managers, is often used to
justify and encourage corporate activities-charitable contributions and the
like-that do not maximize profits. 4 6 Ironically, this characterization is also
used to portray corporate speech-which also, purportedly, does not
maximize profits-as "theft" or "compelled subsidization.' 47 Recall
Justice Brennan's words from Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce:
"I believe it [is] entirely proper for a State to decide to promote the ability
of investors to purchase stock in corporations without fear that their money
will be used to support political candidates with whom they do not
agree. ' 148 Under this characterization, restriction of corporate speech merely
prevents theft and increases corporate profits at. the expense of the
information provided to the public via corporate speech. 49 Further, by
"unbundling" the choice to purchase stock from the decision to support
political speech, curtailing corporate speech both protects the minority rights
of shareholders and reduces the cost of capital.
This is but one characterization of the formal corporate arrangement.
According to some, a corporation is not an artificial entity with property,
owners, and custodians. Instead, what we call a corporation is a nexus of
complex explicit and implicit contracts governing a bundle of agency
relations. 5 ° Creditors and shareholders contribute capital voluntarily, while
workers and directors provide expertise. State law provides off-the-rack
default terms, which the "corporation" may often change at will.' 5 ' Under
this view of the corporation, no one, a priori, owns the corporation.' 52
145

Id.

146

"[T]he 'control' of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral

technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than
private cupidity." BERLE & MEANS, supra note 143, at 356.
147 CLARK, supra note 52, at 683 (noting this irony); Romano, supra note 98, at 994-96
(same).

148494

U.S. 652, 677 n.8 (1990) (emphasis added); see also id. at 675 (characterizing
such speech as theft).
'" See also Brudney, supra note 6, at 257 n.79 ("[I]t is not unreasonable for
government to conclude that management should not have access to stockholders' assets
to urge its views on society . .. ."); Nicholson, supra note 2, at 999 (same).
"50 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 8-14 (1991); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the

Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99, 99 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
...Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency Costs,
38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 283 (1986).
152
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Instead, one's rights and duties depend upon the terms of the particular
contract into which the individual has entered. 5 3 As Professor Fama has
stated:
However, ownership of capital should not be confused with
ownership of the firm. Each factor in a firm is owned by
somebody. The firm is just the set of contracts covering the
way the inputs are joined to create outputs and the way
receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. 54
This revised view of the formal relationship between shareholders and
the corporation has powerful implications for the shareholder protection
rationale.1 55 According to this view, shareholders have no "ownership
rights" in the retained earnings of the firm. Instead, they have voluntarily
associated with an organization that delegates to management the authority
to use cash flow for a variety of purposes-including political speech; their
claim is to the residual. 56 Therefore, corporate political speech is by no
means coercive; it does not entail "forced subsidization." Shareholders
have chosen to supply capital to an entity subject to certain terms. They
cannot later cry "foul" when the firm provides information to the public
which shareholders find distasteful. Although they may suffer some sort of
psychic injury resulting from their attenuated association with the views
expressed, prevention of such psychic harm is not the sort of interest that
will support a large burden on high value speech.157 Instead of relying on the

288, 289 (1980) (abandoning the traditional "presumption that a corporation has owners
in any meaningful sense").
153 Jonathon R. Macey, Externalities,Firm-Specific CapitalInvestments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175, 179-80. Cf.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J. LAW & ECON.
395, 396 (1983) ("Shareholders are no more the 'owners' of the firm than are
bondholders, other creditors, and employees (including managers) who devote specialized
resources to the enterprise . . ").
154 Fama, supra note 152, at 290. See also Macey supra note 153, at 175:
Indeed, contrary to popular belief, it is not particularly useful to think of
corporations in terms of property rights, since the modem theory of the firm tells
us that, while each participant in the corporate enterprise owns certain inputs (labor,
capital, machinery, inventory), the firm itself is nothing but a web of contractual
relationships among these various production factors.
Id.
155 Cf. Romano, supra note 98, at 992 ("Few commentators adopt a contract approach,
which would ascribe the shareholders' rights of political association to their corporate
agents.").
156 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateContract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1425 (1989).
1' See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod., 463
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state to prohibit speech they find offensive, individuals must take affirmative
steps to avoid it.'58 This is simply a restatement of the harm principle: states
may regulate speech only in order to protect the sort of interests legally
redressable at common law. 159 Since shareholders do not own the retained
earnings of the firm, they have no legally-protected interest. They are instead
"insiders" who have voluntarily consented to any attenuated psychic harm
that results.' 6°
2. What Form: A Question of Substance
A finding that shareholder protection is a compelling state interest, then,
involves a choice between the contractual and the Berle and Means portrayal
of the nature of the corporation. Or, as Professor Emerson argued nearly
three decades ago, the propriety of state regulation of the speech of private
associations depends on the degree of control that such organizations exert
over their members.161 Is corporate speech the result of a contract by means
of which investors appoint managers to act in their interests? Or, is it simply
the use by management of retained earnings to promote its personal political
agenda, contrary to the interests and wishes of shareholders?
U.S. 60 (1983); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cantwell v. Connecticut,

310 U.S. 296 (1940).
' Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Co. of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 542 (1980); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943); cf. Pruneyard v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Rowan v. Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728 (1970); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296.
"' See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 151 (1859); F.A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 145 (1960); James R. Branit, Reconciling Free Speech and
Equality: What Justifies Censorship?9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429, 446-49 (1986); see
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 91, 92-93 (1987) ("[M]oral preferences are not as powerful a basis [for
burdening fundamental rights] as is a demonstration that [the activity] injures [non]consenting parties."); Michael W. McConnell, The Originsand HistoricalUnderstanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1464 (1990) (arguing that the
historical underpinnings of the free exercise clause support similar approach to the
definition of "compelling state interest"); cf. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y
of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987) (redressing tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress not a compelling state interest), cert. denied 484 U.S. 926 (1987);
William Van Alstyne, A GraphicReview of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107,
132 (1982) (state may not suppress speech that results in mental anguish by redefining
such anguish as redressable harm).
160 Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1268-69 (1988) (arguing
that the state may not compel vaccinations over religious objection to protect the objector
from harm); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the Consent
Doctrine as Definitional Balancing, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 949 (1986).
161 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 950-52 (1963).
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This is simply a restatement of the old agency cost problem.' 62 The
separation of ownership and control creates divergent interests between
principal (shareholder) and agent (manager).' 6 3 Proponents of shareholder
protection schemes continually highlight these costs, emphasizing the
ineffectiveness of shareholder democracy and the laxity of the business
judgment rule."6 Managers, who write the contracts into which investors
enter, have no incentive to provide terms beneficial to shareholders. Hence,
shareholders have little, if any, input into the "contracts" they enter; the
agreements are best viewed as contracts of adhesion. 6 As a result, contracts
provide management with absolute discretion over corporate speech, i.e.,
they require shareholders to support political speech as a condition of
purchasing stocks. In the same way that union or bar association democracy
does not prevent such organizations from coercing their members into
financially supporting ideas the members oppose," 6 corporate democracy
does not prevent corporations from coercing shareholders into supporting
ideas they oppose. It must be this sort of reasoning that underlies Justice
Brennan's remarkable statement, discussed earlier, 167 that failure to outlaw
corporate speech is indistinguishable, in terms of its coercive effect upon
shareholder expectations, from outlawing corporate speech altogether.
This view ignores the informal, market-oriented mechanisms that align
the interests of managers and shareholders. 68 Specifically, product, labor,
capital, and takeover markets all operate to align these interests, reducing

161

See generally Romano, supra note 98, at 994-95.
& FISCHEL, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 150, at 9-11, 14-15; Jensen

163 EASTERBROOK

& Meckling, supra note 150; Fama, supra note 152; Steven Shavell, Risk sharing and
incentives in the principalagent relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 57-73 (1979).
'64 See Brudney, supra note 6, at 261 n.90 (discussing management control of the
proxy system); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 674 n.5 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Schneider, supra note 35, at 1263-64 ("The usual fact of

corporate life is that management runs the corporation ..... "); see also Shiffrin, supra

note 35, at 1246. See CLARK, supra note 52, at 123-40 (discussing business judgment
rule).
165 Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1412 (1985) ("It stretches the concept 'contract'
beyond recognition to use it to describe either the process of bargaining or the
arrangement[] between investors of publicly held corporations and either theoretical
owners first going public or corporate management.").
'66 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of
Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Emerson, supra note 161, at 951 (as private organizations tend
toward monopoly, internal processes are less likely to protect minority rights).
'67 See supra note 85.
16' Romano, supra note 98, at 996 & n.222; Robert A. Prentice, ConsolidatedEdison
and Bellotti: FirstAmendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J.

599, 633-35 (1981).
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agency costs. 169 Managers hold large quantities of their firm's stock and
devise compensation schemes, such as stock options, that tie remuneration
to firm performance, further reducing these CoStS.170 The ease of
shareholder exit facilitates the operation of these mechanisms. Unlike the
union member in a closed shop state, or the attorney who must join the bar
in order to practice his or her chosen profession, shareholders may
terminate their association with one firm and join another with little pain,
a factor that militates against regulation in and of itself. 7 ' Firms that
engage in conduct that does not maximize profits, such as wasteful speech,
will be penalized as shareholders sell their stock, raising the cost of
capital, 7 2 reducing the wealth of management, and increasing the threat of
takeover. In a world where sophisticated analysts watch every corporate
move, nothing is more likely to draw attention to a frolicking management
team than newspaper advertisements supporting political causes unrelated
to the interests of the corporation.
Some supporters of shareholder protection schemes suggest that such
exit will be ineffective, because it is difficult for some shareholders to
monitor the conduct of their firms. 7 3 This view ignores the tools available
to the modern investor. Shareholders need not gather information about a
firm themselves; they may instead rely upon the price set by a market
filled with sophisticated investors that constantly monitor the performance

169 EASTERBROOK

& FISCHEL,

CORPORATE LAW,

supra note 150, at 91-92; Butler,

supra note 150, at 120-29; see also Oliver D. Hart, The market mechanism as an incentive
scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1983) (product markets); Farna, supra note 152, at 292-95
(labor markets); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1264 (1982) (capital markets); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (market for corporate control).
170 Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership,
Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985); Harold Demsetz, The Structure of
Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 387-90 (1983); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers 'Discretion and Investor Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL.
J. CORP. LAW 540, 559-62.
171 Emerson, supra note 161, at 951 ("[Whether the state should intervene to protect
minority interests] will depend [in part] upon whether conditions are such that a
multiplicity of organizations can exist in the area affected, or whether circumstances drive
toward ... monopoly."). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81 n.13 (1975); Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 710 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("One need not become a member of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce or the Sierra
Club ... to earn a living.").
172 Brudney, supra note 6, at 262; Schneider, supra note 35, at 1266 & n.133. See also
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(prohibiting objectionable speech will ease raising of capital); Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. at 674 n.5 (Brennan, J., adumbrating same point).
171 See Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 674 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Brudney, supra note 6, at 264-65.
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and activities of corporations. Market activity by these individuals will
ensure that share prices reflect the true value of a firm and thus guarantee
that very public actions, such as wasteful speech, will be reflected in the
price of a firm's securities. 7 4 Indeed, in the context-of private actions
under the federal securities laws, courts ordinarily presume that a stock's
present price reflects all publicly available information about it, with the
result that a plaintiff is presumed to have relied on a misstatementwhether he or she was aware of it-when he or she purchased the security
in question.' 75 There is no reason to adopt a different theory regarding the
operation of6 capital markets when evaluating shareholder protection
7
legislation.
In any event, absent reliance on the efficient market, individuals can
still gather information with relative ease, relying on sophisticated financial
intermediaries, i.e., mutual funds or securities analysts.' 77 Such sources do
more than provide information about the "bottom line" of a firm's
operations; many also focus on the social effects. 7 8 These mechanisms,
when combined with the incentives firms have to provide information to
the public, 7 9 facilitate monitoring of management behavior and thus reduce
agency costs.
The various market mechanisms discussed above are not perfect;8 °
they do not guarantee that managers will not misuse corporate funds in one
of many ways, including objectionable speech. As a general matter, a
decision whether to characterize the corporation as a nexus of contracts
depends on an empirical judgment about just how (im)perfect these

174

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the

Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 693-95 (1984).
' Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
176 It is of no moment that certain shareholders, such as those who hold stock via
pension funds, are "locked in" to their investments. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1980) (describing purported
economic. disincentive for shareholders to disassociate with their firm). So long as
corporations are not able to discriminate against shareholders-i.e., pay lower dividends
to some than others-the presence of a significant number of shareholders who are not
"locked in" will protect those who are. See infra note 217.
"' Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 174, at 695.
178 See MARY ROWLAND, THE FIDELITY GUIDE TO MUTUAL FUNDS 112-14 (1990)
(describing "socially responsible" mutual funds and listing examples); AMY L. DOMINI
& PETER D. KINDER, ETHICAL INVESTING (1986) (describing organizations and newsletters
that specialize in socially responsible investments); DREYFUS SERVICE CORPORATION,
PROSPECTUS, THE DREYFUS THIRD CENTURY FUND, INC. (October 1, 1993) (on file with
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.)..
"' Esterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 174, at 687-91; see also
S.J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, DisclosureLaws and Takeover Bids, 35 J.FIN. 323 (1980)
(explaining that firms have strong incentives to disclose optimal amounts of information).
18' Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 156, at 1420-21.
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mechanisms are.'' The efficacy of such mechanisms, however, is the
subject of some dispute. 182 It seems, then, that the constitutional status of
shareholder protection schemes depends on an assessment of the
effectiveness of markets at reducing agency costs.
3. Narrow Tailoring
Given the current state of first amendment jurisprudence, particularly
the requirement of narrow tailoring, one need not conduct a full blown
assessment of the magnitude of agency costs in order to evaluate the
constitutional propriety of limiting all corporate speech to prevent wasteful
speech. For, as the Court has stated, "[w]here at all possible, government
must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular
problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose
the danger that has prompted [the] regulation."' 183 A blanket ban on all
corporate speech, imposed for the purpose of rooting out wasteful speech,
cannot pass constitutional muster if such a ban squelches a non-trivial
amount of profit-maximizing speech and less intrusive means will
adequately protect shareholders against wasteful speech.
Although an exhaustive study is beyond the scope of this Article,
several factors suggest that a significant proportion of corporate speech is
profit-maximizing. Political action committees are more prevalent in
industries that are heavily regulated, thus giving rise to the inference that
corporate political activity-including speech-is a vehicle for advancing the
84
interests of shareholders, not the ideological preferences of management. 1
Indeed, one scholar laments that corporate PACs are not ideological at all;
they simply seek to pilot their members through the "web of federal

181 Brudney, CorporateGovernance, supra note 165, at 1411-12; Romano, supra note
98, at 923.
82 Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare:

Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984) with Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989).
183 Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 265
(1986); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("In the area of First Amendment freedoms, government has the duty to confine itself
to the least intrusive regulations which are adequate for the purpose."). See also Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993) (same test in free
exercise context).
184 Romano, supra note 98, at 995-96 (and citations therein); Bernadette Budde,
Business Political Action Committees, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAWS 9, 11 (Michael J. Malbin, ed., 1980) ("[Tlhe more regulated an industry
and the more obvious an industry is as a congressional target, the more likely it is to have
a political action committee . . ").

1993]

CORPORATE SPEECH

subsidies, federal taxes and federal regulations in which they are
ensnared.' ' 1 85 Also, heavy corporate spending during referenda campaigns
appears to be correlated with the threat that such referenda will have an
adverse effect on corporate profits.' 86 A study of twenty-five California
ballot referenda is instructive; corporations that participated in such
campaigns always had a direct financial stake in the outcome. 8 7 Other
studies yield similar results. 88 These observations, plps others,' 89 suggest
that market mechanisms induce managers to engage in a non-trivial
amount of profit-maximizing speech.
Perhaps most telling in this regard, however, is the body of scholarship
premised upon the assumption that corporations engage in too much profitmaximizing speech. As observed earlier,' 90 several scholars have argued
that corporate speech should be limited for the purpose of protecting the
political process by ensuring that corporations do not exercise "undue
influence" over the political debate. 9' One of these scholars, after
providing several examples of such "undue influence," observes that
"such spending was a prudent, sensible way to protect livelihood and

85William T. Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercion, and the Problem with Corporate
PACs, 29 EMORY L.J. 375, 381-82 (1980).
186 Romano, supra note 98, at 996-97; see also Easley, supra note 2 (discussing
opposition by various interested groups to recycling legislation).
187 Lowenstein, supra note 108. For instance, in discussing an initiative restricting the
construction of nuclear power plants, Professor Lowenstein observes "[tihe largest
contributors and spenders... had direct interests at stake. Thus, the following companies
contributed or spent over $100,000 each: Bechtel Corporation, General Electric, Southern
California Edison Company, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation." Id. at 526 n.75.
See also, e.g., id. at 529 ("Most of the opponents' [of an initiative instituting land-use
planning for the California coast] funds came from oil, utility, and developer interests.");
id. at 533 (describing opposition to a gas tax initiative by "major oil companies, auto
clubs, teamsters, truckers, and road builders"); id. at 537 (noting that "[flive major
tobacco companies and their trade association, the Tobacco Institute, were responsible for
...over 98% of the total" spent in opposition to an anti-smoking proposition).
188 See, e.g., Mastro et al. supra note 1, at 321-23.
189 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, ConsolidatedEdison and Bellotti: First Amendment
Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599, 636 passim (collecting
manifold examples of profit-maximizing speech); see also Robert B. Holt, Jr., Comment,
Corporate Advocacy Advertising: When Business' Right to Speak Threatens the
Administration of Justice, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 623 (1979) (discussing insurance company
advertising campaign decrying large jury verdicts). See generally Easley, supra note 2
(discussing examples).
'9 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
191 Shockley, supra note 1, at 380-81, 388-90; Mastro et al., supra note 1, at 317-19;
Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible FirstAmendment: A Critical FunctionalistApproach to
Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1372
(1983) (state should limit private political expenditures in order to remain independent of
the interests it regulates).
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profits." 19 2 Opponents of corporate political speech, then, argue at crosspurposes; proof that corporations "unduly influence" the political process
is also proof that a substantial amount of corporate speech is profitmaximizing, thereby severely damaging the rationale for shareholder
protection schemes.
Such internal inconsistency is not limited to academia, however. As
noted earlier, in Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court held that
Michigan had a compelling interest that supported the restriction of
corporate speech in connection with electoral campaigns. 193 Apparently the
Justices were concerned that the state-created corporate form allowed the
Michigan Chamber of Commerce and its members too much weight in the
debate over Michigan's workers' compensation policy, an issue that
touches the heart of corporate profitability. Remarkably, one Justice who
joined that majority opinion also authored a concurrence arguing that
Michigan had an equally compelling interest in preventing corporate
speech because such speech would not benefit shareholders! 194 Ultimately,
the Court cannot have it both ways; the Justices cannot assume that
corporations engage in too much profit-maximizing speech while at the
same time arguing that all corporate speech is wasteful.
If, as it seems, corporations do engage in a significant amount of
profit-maximizing speech, a blanket ban-or its equivalent-on corporate
speech does not meet the narrow tailoring requirement. In the words of
Justice Frankfurter written in another first amendment context, "[s]urely
this is to burn the house to roast the pig. ' ' More narrowly tailored
alternatives, such as a stricter business judgment rule and disclosure
requirements, 196 are available to deter wasteful speech without prohibiting
that which is protected. It may be that such alternatives will not eliminate
all wasteful corporate speech. Yet, the Federal Communications
Commission may not prohibit all "dial-a-porn" in order to keep such
material from enterprising youngsters; 197 nor may a state prohibit all sales
of material that tend to corrupt youth to ensure that no such material ever

192 Shockley,
193 Austin

supra note 1, at 380-81 nn.8-9.
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (Brennan, J.,

concurring).
194Id. at 669-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
'9'Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (the Court itself did not reach the
constitutional issue), quoted in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127.
Prohibiting union speech in order to protect dissenters is, indeed, burning down the house
to roast the pig.
196 See Shockley, supra note 1, at 419-21 (recommending disclosure
requirements).
197Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 130-31 (blanket ban on dial-a-porn
unconstitutional, even though less restrictive alternatives may leave a few youngsters able

to secure access tO such material).
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reaches children.1 98 Surely states may not prohibit a large volume of high
value speech in order to make doubly sure that no manager ever abuses his
or her office.199
Put another way, failure to outlaw all corporate speech does create the
possibility of wasteful speech. Thus, states may certainly act to foster the
legitimate expectation, articulated by Justice Brennan, that managers will
not "embezzle" funds via wasteful speech. 200 They, however, may not do
so in a way that entirely prevents individuals from voluntarily speaking
collectively through the corporate structure. Any such blanket
prohibition
20
is far "too blunt an instrument for such a delicate task." '
This is not necessarily to say that a state may adopt a "strict"
business judgment rule for corporate decisions concerning speech, while
retaining a lax one for other decisions. °2 Insofar as agency costs exist with
respect to all corporate behavior, much of which is potentially offensive
one way or another to shareholders, there is no reason to treat speech
differently from any other corporate decision. Indeed, tightening the
business judgment rule solely with respect to corporate speech seems
perverse, since several other corporate decisions, such as those governing
executive compensation and responses to takeover bids, are characterized
by inherent conflicts between the interests of shareholders and management
and thus higher agency CoStS. 20 3 The under-inclusiveness of such a change
would suggest that the legislature sought to suppress speech and not to
reduce agency' ' 2costs,
with the result that the asserted interest would not be
"compelling. 04 Only a uniform tightening of the business judgment rule
would ensure that such a tightening had the purpose of reducing agency
costs and not suppressing speech.

'98

Butler, 352 U.S. at 383-84.

'99 See Bolger v. Young Drug Stores, Inc., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1982) (invalidating blanket
prohibition on the mailing of contraceptives although such prohibition was marginally
more effective than less restrictive alternatives).
200 See supra note 85.
201 Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 265
(1986).
202 Nor could a state prohibit certain varieties of wasteful speech while leaving others

unmolested. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (state cannot
draw content-based distinctions even where speech is otherwise unprotected).
203 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1175 (1981)
(explaining high agency costs where management responds to takeover bids).
204 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2233-34 (1993) (an interest is not "compelling" where the government fails to regulate
other, non-protected conduct that poses the same "threat"). See also Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 674-75 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (and cites
therein).
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B. Offensive, Yet Profitable,Speech
Still, the fact that a substantial proportion of corporate speech is profitmaximizing may not be sufficient to prove that all shareholders consent to
such speech. Instead, many shareholders might strongly disagree with what
their corporation is saying, even where the message advances the economic
interests of the corporation and thus shareholders. Mechanisms that reduce
agency costs will not protect these shareholders. Indeed, by ensuring that
corporate speech is profit-maximizing, these mechanisms may actually
exacerbate the ideological harm. Thus, even if a significant amount of
speech is profit-maximizing, a blanket ban on all corporate speech might
be necessary to ensure that shareholders are not forced to support profitmaximizing yet offensive speech. Just as the Constitution prevents states
from coercing individuals to support a union's political speech, even where
such speech might redound to the benefit of all employees, so too may
states prevent corporations from coercing shareholders into supporting
otherwise profit-maximizing speech that they oppose.2 °5 Such a ban, in the
form of a requirement that corporations speak through segregated funds,
simply requires corporations to unbundle two theoretically distinct items:
the ownership of stock and the "subsidization" of corporate speech.
Indeed, Professor Brudney goes so far as to suggest that preventing
entirely private activity--corporate
speech-enhances the minority's
' 20 6
"freedom of speech.

This view rests upon a miscalculation of the costs of such unbundling
as well as a misunderstanding of the economic characteristics of capital
205

See Brudney, supra note 6, at 268-70. Cf. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494

U.S. at 676-78 & n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing interests of shareholders
unwillingly forced to subsidize such corporate speech).
206 Brudney, supra note 6, at 256. Indeed, Professor Brudney appears to suggest that,
insofar as state involvement is necessary to create corporations, minority shareholders are
at the mercy of corporations, with the result that state intervention is appropriate. It may
be that state action is a sine qua non of what we call a publicly held corporation, although
the most oft-cited example, limited liability, is in some sense inaction. See EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 150, at 42-43 (absent limited liability, capital
markets, and thus corporations, could not function). Indeed, some form of state
involvement is a necessary condition of many activities we ordinarily deem "private."
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976). However, this fact, without more, does not render all such activities
"coercive" such that a compelling state interest is present. Chartering a corporation in
1800 may well have created the opportunity for some type of private coercion, insofar as
such charters often granted their recipients a monopoly. However, given the advent of
general incorporation acts, no such opportunity for coercion results from the creation of
a modem corporation, for reasons stated, infra. See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 36-39 (1991) (describing Jacksonian
movement toward general incorporation acts).
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markets. As courts have recognized in the antitrust context, the
pervasiveness of bundling or tying two theoretically separable items does
not automatically indicate that sellers of the products are using economic
power to coerce undesired acceptance of both items. Instead, such bundling
is only coercive where (1) it is economically feasible to supply the two
items separately, and (2) the seller or sellers have economic power over
one of the items sufficient to impose such bundling. °7
There are various judicial tests for determining whether two items are
separate products in the antitrust context. The Supreme Court has stated
that separateness is present where there is sufficient consumer demand
such that it is efficient for a firm to provide the two products separately.2 °8
Other jurists have argued that two theoretically distinct items do not
constitute separate products if there are substantial efficiencies resulting
from the joint provision of the two items. 20 9 Neither of these tests suggests
that stock ownership and support of corporate political speech are separate
products. Professor Brudney argues that few, if any, corporations offer
such products separately. 2 '0 This argument suggests that there is
insufficient consumer demand to support such an offering.21 ' Further,
contrary to Professor Brudney's suggestion,212 there are significant joint
economies that result from linking the purchase of stock with support for
corporate political speech. As explained earlier, "unbundling" such
"products" entails significant administrative costs, as well as the costs
that result from the free rider problems that attend the reliance on
segregated funds. 213

Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure directly the cost savings
resulting from the joint production of stock ownership and support for
speech. Further, reliance on the absence of "unbundling" as evidence of
the efficiency of bundling is a bit circular: such evidence, by itself, is
equally consistent with the assertion that such bundling is imposed against
a shareholder's wishes. This impasse suggests an examination of the
second element necessary to coercive bundling, that is, economic power.

207 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-21 (1984).

20 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1992). Accord
Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 21-22.
209 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Jack

Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 703-04 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Posner, J.).
2'0 Brudney, supra note 6, at 270.
211 id.
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Id. at 264-65.
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See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text. Indeed, when discussing the costs

of unbundling, Professor Brudney does not mention free rider problems. See Brudney,
supra note 6, at 264-65.
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No corporation possesses the "economic power" necessary to compel
potential shareholders to purchase stock on non-competitive terms. 214 The
New York Stock Exchange alone lists over 2,500 publicly traded
corporations, none of which accounts for more than a minuscule portion
of the outstanding equity of the companies traded on the exchange." 5
Absent a massive conspiracy among major corporations, no firm has
economic power over potential shareholders.2 6 Absent such market power,
bundling must be presumed to be pro-competitive, not coercive.27
More specifically, the pervasiveness of bundling suggests one of two
non-insidious explanations for such bundling. First, it may be that no
significant number of shareholders is willing to pay a positive price for
such unbundling; if such shareholders existed, firms could reduce their cost
of capital by unbundling voluntarily. Second, even if a significant number
of shareholders is willing to pay some positive price for unbundling, it
may be that this price is less than the costs associated with it. In other
words, by bundling stock ownership with an agreement to contribute to
speech, firms may create wealth that is used to pay otherwise offended
shareholders higher returns, thereby inducing these shareholders to put
aside any ideological objections.28

Neither explanation for the existence of bundling requires a conclusion
that all shareholders approve of all corporate political speech. Instead,

214

It may be, however, that certain trade associations possess economic power vis a

vis their member corporations, thus raising the specter that speech funded via the bundling
of "contributions" for non-collective and collective goods is coercive. See supra note
112 and accompanying text. However, as just explained in the text, the presence of such
bundling is equally consistent with the conclusion that the collective and non-collective
goods are not really separate products.
215 See Robert Steiner, Big Board Seeks to Loosen Rules on Holder Voting, WALL ST.
J., June 10, 1992, at C2; Edmund Faltermayer, The Fortune 500 Largest Industrial
Corporations,FORTUNE, April 19, 1993, at 184 (Exxon, the industrial company with the
highest valued outstanding equity, accounts for less than five percent of the outstanding
equity of the Fortune 500 industrial corporations).
216 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (thirty
percent share of relevant market insufficient to show necessary economic power in tying
context).
27 Id. at 37 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Some have suggested that,
absent market power, tying arrangements can promote fraud where unsophisticated
consumers possess little information about the product involved. See Richard Craswell,
Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661 (1982). Yet, absent
price discrimination, such fraud cannot occur in markets, such as capital markets, where
a substantial number of sophisticated consumers are present. See Town Sound and Custom
Tops v. Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d 468, 489 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
218 See Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 497 (1983) (suggesting that practice of bundling several products together creates
efficiencies that induce customers to purchase from the bundling firm).
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shareholders that might have objected have either avoided such concerns
in one of several ways 219 or decided that the benefits of owning stock
outweigh the harm associated with supporting views with which they
disagree. This situation is hardly analogous-either qualitatively or as a
matter of degree-to the actual, state-enforced coercion facing a union
member or attorney who must join a state-sponsored association as a
condition of employment. Thus, such a ban cannot be characterized as an
enhancement of the minority's "freedom" of speech.22° Instead, such a
ban leaves the minority "free" to refuse to contribute to segregated funds
while at the same time reaping the benefits that inure to the corporation as
a result of suboptimal expenditures by segregated funds on corporate
speech that are supported by those shareholders who do contribute.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prohibiting corporate speech leaves shareholders and other interested
parties free to form independent organizations that solicit contributions in
order to espouse ideas. Advocates of shareholder protection schemes claim
that such a regulatory system ensures that the magnitude of corporate
speech reflects voluntary support for the ideas expressed. This conclusion
is correct, but irrelevant. Because corporate speech is a collective good,
voluntary contributions for its provision will far understate the actual
preferences of shareholders for such speech. Far from assuring that speech
will reflect the actual desires of shareholders, such a system creates
substantial free rider problems and thus imposes a substantial burden on
high value speech. Supporters of such schemes claim that they prevent
wasteful speech and protect shareholders from a scheme of "bundling"
that results in compelled subsidization of a point of view.
This Article has argued that such schemes cannot survive constitutional
scrutiny. The rationale for shareholder protection schemes may suffer from
a basic flaw-a mischaracterization of the corporate relationship. Retained
earnings are only shareholder property-and corporate speech theft-if one
adopts that so-called Berle and Means view of the corporate relationship.
If, however, one adopts the contractual theory, such earnings are the
property of no one, and the use of such earnings by management for
speech presents no problem of "compelled subsidization." Instead, the
219

For instance, shareholders who would otherwise object may have invested in

corporations that are not likely to engage in speech offensive to them. An
environmentalist, for instance, could invest in companies that assist in environmental
clean-up. See Stephen Advokat, A Mutual Interest In Cleaning Up, CHIC. TRIB., May 7,

1990, at C5 (discussing various mutual funds that invest in environmental firms).
220 See HAYEK, supra note 159, at 16-17 (discussing various definitions of "freedom"
and noting confusion by some of "liberty" with power).
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corporate contract, which shareholders enter willingly, allows management
to deploy such earnings in ways beneficial to the firm, including political
speech. The choice between these competing theories of the corporation
determines the strength of the state interest supporting the significant
burden on speech that shareholder protection schemes involve.
Such a choice is not to be made a priori. Instead, it must be based
upon an empirical assessment of the agency costs created by the
specialization of function that characterizes the corporate form. More
specifically, one wants to know how much corporate speech is profitmaximizing. It may be true that formal mechanisms have little disciplining
effect upon management decisions, including those concerning speech.
However, many other informal mechanisms ensure that managers will
internalize the effects upon firm profitability of such decisions.
Fortunately, one need not take sides in the empirical debate over
agency costs in order to evaluate the strength of the state interests asserted.
Instead, one need only determine whether a non-trivial amount of corporate
speech is indeed profit-maximizing. The data seem to indicate that, in fact,
a substantial amount of corporate speech is profit-maximizing. Further, the
scholarly case in favor of limiting corporate speech to protect the electoral
process is itself premised upon a belief that corporations engage in too
much profit-maximizing speech. If the data and these scholars are correct
as an empirical matter, shareholder protection schemes cannot survive first
amendment scrutiny.
Of course, even when speech is profit-maximizing, some shareholders
might object to the corporate message on ideological grounds. This
possibility has led some to suggest that states should restrict such speech
to ensure that such shareholders are not coerced into supporting speech
they oppose. However, as shown earlier, no corporation possesses the
economic power sufficient to coerce shareholders into supporting speech
they would otherwise oppose. Further, "unbundling" the purchase of
stock from an agreement to support political speech creates substantial
costs, including the costs associated with free riding. Thus, the pervasiveness of bundling suggests either that (1) the costs of unbundling outweigh
the benefits associated with it, or (2) shareholders are unwilling to pay a
positive price to obtain such unbundling. Neither explanation justifies the
suppression of a substantial quantity of high-value, profit-maximizing
speech.

